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In our paper on "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory
of Tariffs" (1980), we extended the theory of tariffs to include reve-
nue seeking. We also compared tariffs with quotas, under seeking
activities associated with the revenues from the former and with the
rents (i.e., license premia) from the latter. We argued, among other
propositions, that: (1) Revenue seeking was a zero-output activity
undertaken in the presence of, and triggered by, a distortion. (2)
Therefore the questions about whether and what losses it imposed
were second-best (rather than first-best) questions, and thus such a
seeking activity could be beneficial rather than immiserizing (i.e., the
shadow price of a primary factor of production could be [sufficiently]
negative). (3) Correspondingly, premium seeking^—the "command''
counterpart of the revenue-seeking phenomenon—was also a
second-best phenomenon. (4) Therefore, premium seeking may also
be beneficial rather than immiserizing, contrary to Krueger's (1974)
argument reflecting first-best intuition. (5) The welfare cost of a quota
could not, in view of the second-best nature of the problem, be
measured generally (as Krueger [1974] had proposed) as the cost of
an equivalent tariff (in the absence of any seeking) plus the value of
the rents even if all rents were competitively sought. (6) A proper
comparison of tariffs and quotas would have to compare a tariff with
revenue seeking vis-a-vis a quota with premium seeking, in prefer-
ence to Krueger's (1974) comparison of a quota with full premium
Thanks are due to Richard Brecher for drawing to our attention the work of
Mahmudul Anam at Carleton University, who spotted the error noted in this etratum.
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^ Krueger (1974) and we, after her, called this "rent seeking," but "premium seeking"
is a more appropriate term (see Bhagwati 1981; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1981).
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seeking vis-a-vis a tariff with no revenue seeking at all. (7) In that
event, tariffs and quotas could not be uniquely rank ordered in
welfare terms.
All these propositions are valid except for 4. It is impossible (except
in ways which are spelled out later in this note) for premium seeking
to be beneficial. The reason is that, when a quota is binding, it
prevents the second-best nature of the problem from resulting in
welfare improvement since the quantity constraint "bottles up" the
source of positive gain that may outweigh the loss implied by the
diversion of real resources to the zero-output-seeking activity.
The economic argument underlying this result is straightforward.
Recall, from the theory of policy intervention to achieve a non-
economic objective that requires imports to be constrained (John-
son 1967; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1969), that the optimal policy
for this is a tariff policy. It follows that, for the level of binding im-
ports associated with the preseeking equilibrium, the implicit tariff at
that equilibrium is indeed the least-cost tariff. Any move away from
that equilibrium, therefore, will be suboptimal, that is, immiserizing if
imports remain fixed at the same level. Therefore premium seeking,
since it does shift production and therefore the preseeking equilib-
rium, will always be welfare worsening. As long as imports are fixed
quantitatively, therefore, premium seeking has to be immiserizing.
Note further that the result holds equally for export and import
quotas when the country is small. Again, for a small country, the
result will hold if the quotas are defined in foreign values rather than
in pure quantity. However, even for a small country, the critical
constraint on import quantity may be relaxed, opening up the possi-
bility of beneficial premium seeking if an import quota is defined in
domestic values: For, as the implicit tariff falls, the same domestic
value constraint can accommodate an increasing quantity of imports.
For a large country, however, the possibility of admitting the
paradox of beneficial premium seeking is enhanced. Thus, while an
import quota will eliminate this possibility, an export quota does not
(unless one imposes the restriction that the foreign offer curve be
elastic). Thus the same export level may be compatible with more than
one import quantity, and the critical import quantity constraint may
not operate to exclude the paradox of beneficial premium seeking.
Again, even if the import quota is fixed in foreign values, the variable
terms of trade implied by the large-country assumption can relax the
import constraint and open up the paradoxical possibility.^
important issue of comparing seeking activities triggered generally by price
versus quantity distortions has been treated elsewhere by us in depth (Bhagwati and
Srinivasan 1981).
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